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The Bank Panic of 1907
was so serious that it became
a catalyst for the creation of America's
central bank. This study, which examines
the circumstances leading to and the inter-
vention measures taken during the panic,
particularly focuses on trust companies'
function as a financial intermediary. Unequal
regulation among financial organizations, the
authors find, led to a concentration of riskier assets
in less regulated intermediaries, primarily trusts.
Trusts' riskier asset portfolios made them the focal
point from which the crisis spread to other segments of
the financial market. Allowing various types of insti-
tutions comparable access to all assets and investment
opportunities, the authors conclude, might reduce the
risk that the collapse of one type of asset would threaten
the solvency of an entire class of financial intermediary.
F
or the past two centuries recurrent
crises have shaken the banking sys-
tem and financial markets in the
United States. One severe crisis, the Bank
Panic of 1907, disrupted financial markets to
such an extent that it became an important
catalyst for creating the Federal Reserve and
the U.S. banking system as it operates today.
The panic involved several types of financial
intermediaries, each distinct and playing a
unique role in capital markets at the same
time that each operated under a different set
of regulations. This regulatory framework cre-
ated conditions that made a panic more likely
than if regulation had allowed uniform access
to all investment opportunities.
The authors are economists in the macropolicy and regional sections,
respectively, of the Atlanta Fed's research department.
What follows is a case study of an individu-
al financial crisis, a record detailing events
that led up to, and the maneuvers that took
place during, the Panic of 1907. The focus is
on the condition of New York City trust com-
panies, a financial intermediary that had
grown rapidly in prominence at the turn of the
century and experienced the most severe de-
positor runs during the Bank Panic of 1907.
Their growth can be attributed largely to freer
investment opportunities that resulted from
being less subject to regulation than state or
national banks. Although trust companies
were profitable, their specialization in collat-
eralized loans, perceived as risky loans to
firms that could not obtain credit through na-
tional or state banks, added to the severity of
the panic.
This research has direct relevance for the
regulation of intermediaries. Examining the
role of the trust company as a financial inter-
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the crucial role that uneven regulation played
in determining the composition of asset port-
folios of banks and trusts. Because trusts took
advantage of investment opportunities to




How does a financial crisis begin? What
prompts a panic? Most answers suggest that
financial calamities result from an unusual
combination of economic conditions and
events. In the case of the 1907 Panic the col-
lapse of F. Augustus Heinze's attempt to cor-
ner the market for copper stock apparently
triggered the chain of events, but informed
observers agree that the same developments
probably would not have led to a panic in a
more benign economic environment.
1 Oliver
M.W. Sprague, writing for the National Mone-
tary Commission in 1910, describes in detail
the economic conditions and special circum-
stances that resulted in the Panic of 1907.
Unusually severe liquidity problems in New
York City emerge as a backdrop in the crisis.
Seasonal Liquidity Fluctuations. During
the National Banking Era the New York money
market faced seasonal variations in interest
rates and liquidity resulting from the trans-
portation of crops from the interior of the
United States to New York and then to
Europe. The outflow of capital necessary to fi-
nance crop shipments from the Midwest to
the East Coast in September or October usu-
ally left New York City money markets
squeezed for cash. As a result, interest rates
in New York City were prone to spike upward
in autumn. Seasonal increases in economic
activity were not matched by an increase in
the money supply because existing financial
structures tended to make the money supply
"inelastic." The base money stock—gold,
greenbacks, national bank notes, and gold
and silver certificates—was also affected by
unusual variations in gold flows through for-
eign exchange markets. Recent research by
Fabio Canova offers evidence that external
disruptions to the movement of gold were
important determinants of bank panics.
2
Atypical gold flows in 1907 seem to have con-
tributed to the extreme seasonal tightness in
New York City's money markets in the fall.
The absence of finance bills during 1907
substantially altered gold flows, contributing
to the conditions that framed the crisis.
Finance bills were contracts to extend cred-
it—essentially bonds issued to borrow over-
seas in hope of profit from anticipated
exchange-rate fluctuations. The dollar's ex-
change rate varied over the year, strengthen-
ing during the harvest season when foreign
demand for dollars to purchase crops was
high and weakening thereafter. Finance bills
were most frequently drawn in the summer,
two or three months before crop movement,
when the dollar price of sterling was quite
high (E.W. Kemmerer 1910). Banks and trust
companies then sold sterling notes for dollars
when sterling was stronger and repaid the
notes when the dollar value of sterling was
lower, thus making a profit. Increased use of
finance bills seems to have reduced the
volatility of exchange rates and the volume of
gold shipments overseas, enhancing the effi-
ciency of the international exchange market,
according to C.A.E. Goodhart and Margaret
Myers. Finance bills also provided a crude fu-
tures or forward market in foreign exchange.
International Gold Flows. Unlike the for-
eign exchange market, domestic trade offered
no such contractual provision to smooth capi-
tal flows. The New York money market trans-
ferred funds to the interior of the United
States to finance transport of agricultural
goods to New York City ports. Without a
mechanism to arbitrage regional interest rates
or increase liquidity, interest rates in New
York City generally climbed during the fall.
This regular pattern signaled the increased
liquidity needs of New York City banks. Usu-
ally, higher interest rates attracted sufficient
funds to offset the city's money shortage. In
1907, however, aberrations in international
gold flows created additional credit con-
straints in the financial market that height-
ened the probability of a panic.
In the spring of 1906 the U.S. Treasury
Department, under Secretary Leslie Shaw, de-
vised policies to stimulate gold imports into
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ceived to be a shortage of gold. Subsidizing
gold imports through the use of finance bills,
the policy generated a significant inflow of $50
million in a little more than a month, between
April and May 1906. In typical trade, finance
bills issued during the summer would have
prevented such substantial gold outflows
from England. As it was, large-scale exports of
gold from London nearly spurred a crisis in
Great Britain. To defend its domestic finan-
cial markets, the Bank of England raised its
discount rate in late 1906 and threatened an-
other increase if American finance bills were
not paid upon maturity without renewal
(Myers).
Thus finance bills were suspended during
1907, substantially constricting the system of
arbitrage that minimized actual shipments of
gold. In 1907, despite relatively high U.S. in-
terest rates, the United States exported $30
million in gold to London during the summer.
As a result, the New York money market was
left with an uncharacteristically low volume of
gold upon entering the fall season of cash
tightness.
3 New York financial markets were
thus pressed by even less liquidity than usual
at precisely the time when the need for
money intensified. Any shock to the financial
markets could, and in 1907 did, spark a major
crisis.
The Onset of the Panic
Such a shock occurred on October 16, 1907,
when F. Augustus Heinze's attempt to corner
the stock of United Copper Company failed.
Although United Copper was only modestly
significant, the collapse of Heinze's scheme,
which came atop a slowing economy, a declin-
ing stock market, and a tight money market,
sparked one of the most severe bank panics
of the National Banking Era. Investigation of
Heinze's interests exposed an intricate net-
work of interlocking directorates across banks,
brokerage houses, and trust companies in
New York City. Contemporary observers like
Sprague believed that the close associations
between bankers and brokers heightened de-
positors' anxiety.
As Heinze's extensive involvement in
banking became apparent, along with that of
another speculator associated with the cop-
per scam, C.F. Morse, depositors' fears of in-
solvency precipitated a series of runs on the
banks where the two men held prominent po-
sitions. After the failure of his attempt to cor-
ner United Copper stock, Heinze was forced
to resign from the presidency of Mercantile
National, and worried depositors began a run
on the bank. The New York Clearinghouse, a
consortium of banks in New York City, exam-
ined the bank's assets, announced that it was
solvent, and stated that the clearinghouse
would support Mercantile on the condition
that Heinze and his board of directors resign.
During the reorganization of Mercantile
National Bank, the New York Clearinghouse
began examining other banks that had in-
terests related to Heinze and that had been
raising suspicion for some time. The restructur-
ing of Mercantile revealed that Morse was one
of that bank's directors. Sprague (1910, 248)
describes Morse as having "an extreme char-
acter, even when judged by American specu-
lative standards."
Morse was a director of seven New York
City banks, three of which he controlled com-
pletely. He was also held in low esteem by
most other bankers. His connection with
Mercantile's difficulties worried depositors at
his other banks, and two called for aid from
the clearinghouse on October 19 in response
to large withdrawals of deposits. The clearing-
house granted assistance on the condition
that Morse retire completely from banking in
New York. During the weekend, both Morse
and E.R. Thomas, another of Heinze's cohorts,
were relieved of their remaining banking in-
terests. The clearinghouse promised to sup-
port those banks as well.
The assets of Heinze's banks totaled $71
million, compared to over $2 billion in all New
York City banks and trusts (Sprague 1910,
249). Although this was a significant amount,
depositors apparently considered the clear-
inghouse's promise of a $10 million fund to
aid former Heinze banks sufficient because no
notable run occurred on the banks. On
Monday, October 21, Mercantile National re-
sumed business with new management, and
the run ceased. Similar action was taken at
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F. Augustus Heinze, a key player in the ini-
tial stage of the panic, rose rapidly to notoriety
in the financial world after he won a highly pub-
licized legal battle against Amalgamated
Copper in Butte, Montana. Amalgamated had
been organized a few years earlier by several
Standard Oil Company executives and fi-
nanciers, including James Stillman of National
City Bank of New York. The purchasers of
Amalgamated reportedly earned a profit of $36
million on an investment of $39 million, which
had gone primarily toward the acquisition of the
Anaconda mines in Montana (New York Times,
October 17, 1907).
Heinze, who owned a copper mine near the
Amalgamated Mines, claimed that veins of cop-
per from his mine extended under land owned
by Amalgamated and that according to the
"apex law" he had a right to mine it (Carosso
1970, 112). The matter was pursued in an exten-
sive legal confrontation that was eventually set-
tled out of court in February 1906, when Heinze
sold his copper interest to Amalgamated for a
reported $25 million, half in cash and half in
Amalgamated securities.
Heinze took his gains to New York City,
where he became involved in banking (Allen
1935). In January 1907 newspaper articles had al-
ready associated Heinze with E.R. Thomas and
C.F. Morse, both New York bankers and owners
of the Mechanics and Traders State Bank and
Consolidated Bank, Heinze was placed on the
board of directors of eight banks and two trust
companies.
1 Elected president of Mercantile
National Bank in February 1907, he immediately
replaced the directorship with his associates.
The Heinze group gained control of several
other banks quite quickly through "chain bank-
ing," an organizational strategy similar to today's
bank holding company. The group would buy
stock in a bank and use it as collateral to borrow
money, which was then used to buy stock in an-
other bank or trust.
Heinze's attempt to corner the stock of
United Copper, a company of which he was
president, eventually triggered the Panic of
1907. The corner attempt, which probably ex-
plains the steady and relatively high price of
United Copper stock despite a weak copper
market during 1907, was not an unusual strategy.
However, unlike other market corner schemes,
this one seemed to be public knowledge, as
suggested by several newspaper articles refer-
ring to the intent of the Heinze group (see
below). His reputation as a speculator was fur-
ther reinforced when the respected investment
banking house J.S. Bache withdrew from its busi-
ness relations with Heinze in February 1907
(New York Times, February 15, 1907).
The alleged corner of United Copper stock
collapsed in October 1907. It was foiled in part
by actions taken by an Amalgamated subsidiary,
United Metals Selling Company, which appar-
ently had been manipulating the market for raw
copper. Subsequent Pujo Committee investiga-
tions revealed that United Metals Selling
Corporation sold only 5 million pounds of cop-
per from April to August 1907 (U.S. Congress, 734;
see also 717-40). The normal amount ranged
from 150 million to 250 million pounds. When
Congressional Counsel Samuel Untermeyer
pressed assistant manager Tobias Wolfson of
the United Metals Selling Corporation for an ex-
planation, he stated that no buyers could be
found for copper. Untermeyer then quipped,
"And all of a sudden, in October, they were in-
terested in 93 million pounds in a single
month?" Wolfson responded, "Yes. They had
used up all that they had bought." As a result of
these market manipulations, the price of raw
copper plummeted, and the price of copper
mining stocks broke. Having reached a high of
nearly $121 a share in January 1907, Amal-
gamated Copper fell from $56 1/4 to $41 3/4 in
October. Although United Copper maintained a
steady price throughout the first half of October,
the following events led to the total collapse of
the Heinze interests.
United Copper first reached the headlines of
the New York Times on Tuesday, October 15. On
Monday its stock had risen from $39 to $60 dur-
ing the first 15 minutes of trading on the Curb
Market.
2 Buying was not done through Heinze
brokers. Curb brokers emphasized that Heinze
brokers had been taking great pains to keep
track of all shares in United Copper that had
come out since the high prices of January 1907,
in an attempt to distinguish short selling.
3 Short
positions in United Copper were thus known to
be dangerous. Heinze was not interested in the
total number of shares outstanding because he
believed many shares were held in the western
United States, where, in those days, they could
take a week or more to reach New York for sale;
rather, Heinze was concerned about how many
shares were quickly accessible to the market.
Apparently thinking the time was right for a
corner, Heinze purchased a large quantity of
shares on Monday through the brokerage house
of his brother, Otto Heinze. Many shares of
United Copper had appeared on the market
during trading on Saturday, October 12, and
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lending out his shares of United Copper to sup-
port short selling of the stock. He ordered Gross
and Kleeberg, a brokerage house started in
1904, to purchase 6,000 shares of the stock at as-
cending prices, so that he was in effect buying
his own shares again from short sellers at a high-
er price to attract more short sales. Of course,
the short sellers did not realize that Heinze al-
ready owned the shares that they had borrowed
and that he was now buying from them. This ac-
tion, Heinze hoped, would force short sellers to
a settlement in a technique known as a "bear
squeeze." The squeeze would result when
Heinze owned a large percentage of United
Copper stock, in which the majority of actively
traded shares were his own—shares that he had
purchased from brokers who allowed large
short-sale positions. Then, even though he had
bought shares at increasing prices, by demand-
ing delivery of his shares Heinze intended to
force short sellers to come up with shares that
they did not possess, and could not possess,
unless they bought them from Heinze. Thus the
settlement between Heinze and the short seller
could be at almost any price and would clearly
provide Heinze with a profit as long as there
was no other source for United Copper shares.
To punish the exchange houses that had
gone short in United Copper stock, Heinze put
out an order calling in all his United Copper
shares. However, Heinze's actions were ill-
advised because his suspicions of short sales
turned out to be unfounded. Gross and
Kleeberg found many shares not owned by
Heinze for sale at high prices. More shares ap-
peared on Tuesday after news of the high stock
price spread, so the anticipated time lag be-
tween the increase in stock price and the addi-
tional number of shares for sale was insufficient
to support a corner
Heinze's corner was further thwarted by what
appeared to be the maneuvers of an unknown
group of individuals determined to hinder his
scheme by controlling a large block of United
Copper stock. Newspaper sources reported that
on Tuesday the transfer agency of United
Copper, T. Buckingham, refused to transfer own-
ership of 17,830 shares of common stock
(Commercial and Financial Chronicle, January 4,
1908). The agency claimed that the block was
held in a joint account and could not be trans-
ferred unless both parties agreed. A newspaper
article reported that Heinze believed a "market
pool" of United Copper stock was being lent out
to short sellers in violation of the agreement, al-
though Heinze did not identify who was in the
pool {New York Times, October 17, 1907). Had the
pool been unwilling to cooperate, Buckingham's
refusal of the transfer order might have prevent-
ed the market pool from upsetting the attempt-
ed corner. Announcement of the refusal
strengthened United Copper stock on Tuesday,
though it still closed down 16 from the previous
day. When legal action was threatened against
the refusal of transfer, the order was rescinded
and the transfer went through.
On Wednesday Heinze's corner attempt suf-
fered the final blow. Gross and Kleeberg were
forced to sell United Copper stock to pay for the
shares purchased earlier on margin. United
Copper fell from $36 to $10 a share, and the firm
had to suspend operations. The same day, the
brokerage house Otto Heinze and Company
closed. It was said at the stock market that Heinze
and his brokers were "taken to the wall." The bro-
kers had bought large amounts of United Copper
stock on margin at increasing prices resulting al-
most entirely from their own purchases. When
they stopped buying, the price fell, threatening
their financial position. As Heinze interests were
forced to sell their shares purchased on margin,
the stock price broke dramatically.
The newspaper attributed the failure of the
corner to the market pool of stock held by un-
known individuals whose transactions Heinze
had attempted to block through the transfer
agent. One commentator suggests that Amal-
gamated Copper interests, namely H.H. Rogers,
Stillman, and other powerful financiers, were
"waiting in the wings" to deny Heinze an oppor-
tunity to corner the market in his stock (Robert
Sobel). This analysis is feasible. If the stock was
traded infrequently, Heinze would not have
been aware of how much stock existed to be un-
loaded during his corner maneuver.
Notes
1Banks were Mercantile National, Consolidated
National, Mechanics and Traders, Union, Bank of
Discount, Riverside, Northern National, and
Merchants Exchange National; trusts were Hudson
and Empire (New York Times, January 21, 1907).
2The Curb Market in those days actually took place
outdoors on the curb of the street. It later moved in-
doors and is now the American Stock Exchange.
3 A short sale is a maneuver in which the seller, expect-
ing prices to fall, offers stock he or she does not yet
own to be delivered at a future date, taking profits
from the difference between current (high) prices
they would be paid and the future (low) prices they
would face to acquire the stock.
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the Heinzes, and by October 21 reorganiza-
tion of the national banks was complete.
The Run on Trusts
By October 21, nothing resembling a sys-
temic panic had yet stricken the banks, as
Sprague points out (1910, 250). Depositors at
Mercantile Bank withdrew funds but rede-
posited them in other New York City banks.
The conditions of the economy, however, were
uncertain. The apparant lack of liquidity in the
financial markets, as discussed above, set the
stage for a major financial crisis to erupt from
circumstances that in other times might not
have sparked concern.
Many historical accounts of the Panic of
1907 cite Monday, October 21, as the begin-
ning of the crisis among the trust companies.
On that day the National Bank of Commerce
announced that it would stop clearing checks
for the Knickerbocker Trust Company, the
third largest trust in New York City. However,
Vincent Carosso (1987, 535) suggests that the
run on Knickerbocker began October 18, when
Charles Barney, the Knickerbocker president,
was reported to have been involved in
Heinze's corner maneuver. Drawing from the
private papers of J.P. Morgan, Carosso notes
that the National Bank of Commerce had
been extending loans to the Knickerbocker
Trust to hold off depositor runs. National Bank
of Commerce's refusal to continue acting as a
clearing agent for Knickerbocker was inter-
preted as a vote of no confidence that seri-
ously alarmed Knickerbocker depositors.
Morgan, along with James Stillman of
National City Bank and George Baker of First
National Bank, had organized an informal
team to oversee relief efforts during the panic
at the national banks (Carosso 1970, 129; 1987,
538-39). Assisting them were several young fi-
nancial experts responsible for evaluating the
assets of troubled institutions and indicating
which ones were worthy of aid. Chief among
these investigators was Benjamin Strong of
Banker's Trust Company, who would later be-
come president of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York.
4
On Monday evening, October 21, Morgan
had organized a meeting of trust company ex-
ecutives to discuss ways to halt the panic.
Strong reported to Morgan that he was unable
to evaluate Knickerbocker's financial condi-
tion in the short time before funds would
have to be committed. Unwilling to act on lim-
ited information, Morgan decided not to aid
the trust; this decision kept other institutions
from offering substantial aid as well. On
October 22 Knickerbocker underwent a run for
three hours before suspending operations
just after noon, having paid out $8 million in
cash.
Ironically, next to the front-page article de-
scribing the suspension of the Knickerbocker
Trust in the Wednesday, October 23, edition
of the New York Times was a headline describ-
ing Trust Company of America, the second
largest trust company in New York City, as the
current "sore point" in the panic. By attracting
attention to Trust Company, the newspaper
article greatly exacerbated the serious run on
it. Barney, who was president of Knicker-
bocker, was also a member of the board of di-
rectors of Trust Company of America.
It has been argued that the statement in
the New York Times by George W. Perkins, one
of Morgan's partners, citing Trust Company's
problems as the current "sore point" was an
attempt to isolate the panic at an important,
fundamentally sound institution that would
presumably be aided through the run by the
major financiers (Frederick Lewis Allen 1949,
248-49). Trust Company of America was near
the Morgan and Company offices, making it a
likely candidate for such a maneuver. During
the panic, the newspapers described frequent
exchanges of big leather boxes between
Morgan offices and Trust Company offices, sig-
naling the exchange of money and securities.
However, H.L. Satterlee, Morgan's son-in-law,
later emphasized that no banker would have
purposely started a run on any bank for fear
that the panic might eventually engulf his own
institution as well (470).
On Tuesday, October 22, withdrawals from
Trust Company of America were approximate-
ly $1.5 million; on the Wednesday when the
ill-timed article was published depositors
claimed another $13 million of nearly $60 mil-
lion in total deposits. Withdrawals from Trust
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were a further $8 million to $9 million. During
the span of the run, which lasted two weeks,
Trust Company of America reportedly paid
out $47.5 million in deposits.
5
Rescue Efforts
Realizing that the failure of Trust Company
of America and Lincoln Trust, another institu-
tion whose distress had been publicized,
would endanger the New York money market,
a committee of five trust company presidents
formed to assist trusts in trouble. Not all
trusts were willing to cooperate, though, so
the committee was not able to collect enough
money to provide reliable relief for a trust
company facing a sudden run. They peti-
tioned Morgan for help.
Morgan, Baker, and Stillman knew that aid
for Trust Company of America was not certain
and saw that the collapse of several large
trusts would be disastrous. Strong had arrived
at Trust Company of America sometime after
2:00 A.M. Wednesday and had begun to ap-
praise its assets. That afternoon he reported
to Morgan that Trust Company was basically
sound and deserved assistance. Morgan chan-
neled about $3 million to Trust Company just
before closing time, which allowed it to re-
sume business the next day.
Aid began to come from several other
sources. J.D. Rockefeller deposited $10 mil-
lion with the Union Trust to help the trusts
and announced his support for Morgan.
Secretary of the Treasury George Cortelyou
and the major New York financiers met on the
evening of Wednesday, October 23, and dis-
cussed plans to combat the crisis. Cortelyou
deposited $25 million of the Treasury's funds
in national banks the following morning.
Between October 21 and October 31, the
Treasury deposited a total of $37.6 million in
New York national banks and provided $36
million in small bills to meet runs. By the mid-
dle of November, however, the U.S. Treasury's
working capital had dwindled to $5 million.
Thus Treasury could not and did not con-
tribute much more aid during the rest of the
panic (Timberlake, 173-78).
Crisis on the Stock Exchange
Meanwhile, by Thursday, October 24, call
money on the New York Stock Exchange was
nearly unobtainable. Call money was money
lent for the purchase of stock equity, with the
stock serving as collateral for the loans. Call
loans could be called in at any time. The
opening rate for call money was 6 percent, but
exchange president Ranson H. Thomas no-
ticed a serious scarcity of money. At one point
that morning a bid of 60 percent went out for
call money. Yet, even at that exorbitant rate,
no money was offered. The last recorded
transaction of the day was at the opening rate
of 6 percent (U.S. Congress, 355). Fearing a
total collapse of the stock market, Thomas
called Stillman for aid. Stillman referred
Thomas to Morgan, who was in control of most
of the available funds. While Thomas traveled
to Morgan's office, the call money rate on the
exchange reached 100 percent.
In his testimony to the Pujo Committee, es-
tablished in 1912 by Congress to investigate
the possible existence of New York City
money cartels and their potential conspiracy
to precipitate the panic, Morgan's partner
Charles Steele described efforts to provide
funds to the stock market during the crisis.
Morgan, who reportedly discussed the situa-
tion at the stock exchange with other bankers
before his meeting with Thomas, told Thomas
to announce that $25 million would be avail-
able on the exchange floor. After a short time,
Steele arrived at the exchange with a list of
national banks which, as a group, promised to
loan $25 million to the exchange, including $4
million from First National and $8 million from
National City. The market borrowed a total of
$18.95 million that day (U.S. Congress, 457).
Indirect use of Treasury funds to forestall
collapse of the market during the panic also
came under scrutiny during the Pujo investi-
gation. Legally restricted to national banks,
Treasury deposits were channeled toward the
banks that most quickly presented acceptable
collateral, which for the most part meant
Treasury bonds. Direct use of Treasury de-
posits in the stock market was prohibited. In
testifying to the Pujo Committee, however,
Treasury Secretary Cortelyou explained that
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before they were credited; rather, the major fi-
nanciers determined the most appropriate
application for the money (U.S. Congress,
439). Thus, in effect, nearly all the funds con-
tributed to aid the panic were controlled by
Morgan, who decided how much money
would be used and where.
Trying to determine whether government
funds were used directly to ease the credit
strain on the stock market, the counsel for
the Pujo Committee, Samuel Untermeyer,
pressed Cortelyou for information about the
specific amount of government deposits re-
ceived by each national bank from the total
$25 million allocated. Cortelyou had no recol-
lection of the transactions and did not know
whether the Treasury had records of them.
Estimates of available cash reserves in
New York national banks indicate they were
high enough to provide funds to the stock
market had government funds been denied to
the exchange. On August 22, 1907, New York
national banks held $218.8 million. Cash re-
serves in the "big six" national banks were
$140.7 million.
6 On December 3, 1907, re-
serves had fallen to $177 million for all New
York national banks and $112.5 million for the
"big six." During the worst period in the pan-
ic, reserves were probably lower. However, to
offer their own funds to the stock market,
banks would have had to drop below the legal
25 percent reserve requirement. Thus Unter-
meyer's concerns were not without a basis de-
spite the apparent availability of funds from
banks. The congressional testimony suggests
that Morgan simply allocated the government
deposits in national banks to the stock ex-
change in the same amounts that the govern-
ment deposited them.
On October 25 another money pool was re-
quired. About $10 million came from the Mor-
gan group, $2 million from First National, and
$500,000 from Kuhn, Loeb, and Company. This
time, however, Morgan allowed the market to
determine the call money rate, which re-
mained at nearly 50 percent most of the day.
The Morgan funds had restrictions designed
to stifle speculation. First, no margin sales
were allowed—only cash sales for investment.
Also, the full amount of Morgan money was
not released until afternoon. Morgan's partner,
Perkins, noted that the money collected for
the Friday stock exchange pool was about the
most that could be collected that day and yet
was barely enough to keep the market open
(Allen 1949, 255). Throughout the stock ex-
change crisis, both Trust Company of America
and Lincoln Trust were supported by Morgan's
efforts.
Actions of the New York
Clearinghouse Association
While financiers were working out the
crises with the trusts and the call loan market,
money and reserves had become increasingly
tight at banks. On October 26 the clearing-
house issued clearinghouse loan certificates
as an artificial mechanism to increase the sup-
ply of currency available to the public, a tactic
it had used in earlier financial crises in 1873
and 1893 (see Richard Henry Timberlake,
Gary Gorton, or Ellis Tallman).
Although the national banking system of-
fered no legal mechanism to increase the sup-
ply of currency quickly, loan certificates
provided an informal (if unlawful) way to free
up a sizable amount of cash. In normal busi-
ness banks used currency as reserve assets
and as the medium to clear accounts with
each other. Clearinghouse loan certificates en-
abled banks to monetize their noncurrency
assets during a crisis: banks would substitute
loan certificates for currency in their clearings,
thus releasing the currency to pay depositors
who demanded cash. Loan certificates were
not recognized as currency by the public or by
depositors, and they were supposed to be cir-
culated only among banks. However, A. Piatt
Andrew (1908) noted that during the 1907
Panic, a number of substitutes for cash were
employed in transactions.
Following the first issue of clearinghouse
loan certificates on October 26 during the
1907 Panic, loans initially increased by about
$11 million. During the next three weeks more
than $110 million in certificates were issued in
New York City. Nearly $500 million in currency
substitutes circulated throughout the country
as a "principal means of payment," according
to Andrew (1910, 515). Sprague has criticized
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certificates until after the panic was well
under way. He believed that issuing certifi-
cates as soon as the crisis struck the trusts
would have calmed the market by allowing
banks to accommodate their depositors more
quickly. Aid would have gone directly to trou-
bled banks and trusts, and the cumbersome
device of money pools could have been
avoided. Fewer loans would have been called
in, thus reducing the tension at the stock ex-
change (Sprague 1910, 257-58).
The clearinghouse also restricted the con-
vertibility of deposits into cash—an action
which, like issuing loan certificates, was ille-
gal. The restriction, referred to as "suspension
of payments," increased transaction costs.
Nevertheless, banks continued other busi-
ness activities such as accepting deposits and
clearing checks. The suspension of payments
spread across the country through the system
of correspondent banks. Though convertibility
was widely restored by the beginning of
January, in a few instances loan certificates
and other substitutes for cash circulated as
late as March 1908.
Distress Spreads
New York City government was also near-
ing a financial crisis of its own. It needed $30
million in new funds but had delayed a bond
issue because of the situation in the financial
markets. The city had attempted to float a
bond issue in the summer of 1907, but even
then the bonds had not found a market.
Though no source specifies how the New York
City Comptroller financed city expenditures
for the interim, it seems the city used short-
term loans to pay its expenses until another
bond issue could be attempted. The Mayor of
New York, George McClellan, approached
Morgan on Monday, October 28, with the city's
financial problems. Short-term obligations
were coming due, and the city had no funds
with which to pay them. Morgan recognized
that if the city defaulted on its loans, the crisis
could become completely unmanageable.
Morgan, Stillman, and Baker thus agreed
on October 29 to underwrite a $30 million, 6
percent bond issue of New York City. Morgan
devised a plan in which the major banks
would take pro rata shares of the issue and
deposit them with the clearinghouse. The
clearinghouse would then issue clearinghouse
loan certificates in an equal amount and cred-
it them to the city's accounts at First National
and National City.
Meanwhile, the lack of money to the call
loan market was threatening the brokerage
house of Moore and Schley. The firm had bor-
rowed $25 million from New York banks, plac-
ing a large block of Tennessee Coal, Iron, and
Railroad Company stock as collateral. The
loans were about to come due. To complicate
matters, the brokerage was already using the
same stock as collateral on other loans it had
granted to its senior partner, Grant B. Schley,
Baker's brother-in-law.
If Moore and Schley liquidated the stock to
pay off its loan, the price of the stock would
have tumbled, causing the call loan market to
become even tighter. In the face of an already
weak stock market, such a disruption could
have been disastrous, undermining confi-
dence even further.
Morgan eventually solved the problem by
giving his support to a plan designed by his
attorney and friend, Lewis Cass Ledyard.
Ledyard proposed that U.S. Steel buy Moore
and Schley's shares of Tennessee Coal, Iron,
and Railroad, paying for them with its own
highly rated 5 percent gold bonds. Carosso
(1970) has noted that this maneuver was im-
portant for several reasons. Moore and Schley
would be saved without depressing the stock
market, and U.S. Steel would be able to ab-
sorb a competitor. The innovative aspect of
this arrangement was that it involved no cur-
rency in a market that was already cash-short
from the runs on the trust companies. The
deal went through on Monday, November 4,
after President Roosevelt agreed not to op-
pose it on antitrust grounds.
The crisis at the trust companies continued
during the Moore and Schley episode. Trust
Company of America and Lincoln Trust re-
quired further aid, and Morgan convinced
other trust presidents to support a $25 million
loan for the troubled institutions. The funds
were provided on November 4 after several
nights of negotiation. The panic began to ease
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by Morgan agreed to form a consortium to
support trust companies facing runs.
The New York Clearinghouse had detailed
knowledge of the quality of bank assets in
New York. A similar, formal organization of
trust companies would have had current
knowledge of the assets and liabilities of its
member trusts. Such an organization could
have more readily assessed the situation at
trust companies facing runs than the ad hoc
consortiums and money pools organized by
Morgan. As Sprague has argued and experi-
ence supports, however, the legislative solu-
tion to a major crisis is usually more
government regulation rather than improved
industry self-supervision (1910, 273).
The Role of the Trusts
It is not surprising that trust companies
early on became the focal point of the panic.
In New York, trust assets had grown phenome-
nally between 1890 and 1910, increasing 244
percent during the 10 years ending in 1907,
from $396.7 million to $1,394.0 million. In con-
trast, national bank assets grew 97 percent,
from $915.2 million to $1,800.0 million, while
state-chartered bank assets grew 82 percent,
from $297 million to $541.0 million (Barnett,
234-35). Thus the manner in which trust com-
panies used their assets greatly affected the
New York money market. (For a more detailed
analysis of the role of trusts in the panic, see
Moen and Tallman.)
Trust companies were much less regulated
than national or state banks in New York. In
1906 New York State instituted a requirement
that trusts maintain reserves at 15 percent of
deposits, but only 5 percent of deposits
needed to be kept as currency in the vault.
Before that time trusts simply kept whatever
reserves they felt necessary to conduct busi-
ness. National bank notes were adequate as
cash reserves for trusts while national banks
in central reserve cities like New York were re-
quired to keep a 25 percent reserve in the
form of legal tender or specie.
Trusts were originally rather conservative
institutions, managing estates, holding securi-
ties, and taking deposits, but by 1907 trusts
were performing most of the functions of
banks except issuing bank notes. Many of the
larger trusts specialized in underwriting secu-
rity issues. Others wrote mortgages or invest-
ed directly in real estate—activities barred or
limited for national banks. New York City
trusts had a higher proportion of collateral-
ized loans than did New York City national
banks. Conventional banking wisdom asso-
ciated collateralized loans with riskier in-
vestments and riskier borrowers. The trusts,
therefore, had an asset portfolio that may
have been riskier than those of other interme-
diaries.
National and private banks found the in-
vestment banking functions of trusts so useful
that many of them gained direct or indirect
control of a trust through holding companies
or by placing their associates on a trust's
board of directors. In many instances a bank
and its affiliated trust operated in the same
building.
Trusts appear to have provided intermedi-
ary functions different from those of banks.
Although the volume of deposits subject to
check at trusts was similar to that at banks,
trusts had much less clearing activity than did
banks, registering clearings only about 7 per-
cent of the volume of those at banks. Trusts
were not then like commercial banks, whose
assets are used as transactions balances by
individual depositors or firms.
National banks were part of a network of
regional banks that had correspondent rela-
tionships to expedite interregional transac-
tions (James, 40). Trusts were not part of the
correspondent banking system, so their de-
posits were more local and less directly sub-
ject to the recurring seasonal strains on funds.
The most severe runs in New York City
were limited to the trust companies, not the
state or national banks (Moen and Tallman).
Trusts' riskier asset portfolios in conjunction
with their ambiguous relationship to the New
York Clearinghouse signaled to depositors
that the trusts were likely to become insol-
vent during an economic and financial down-
turn.
7 Runs forced trusts to liquidate their
most liquid assets, call loans on the stock
market. Large-scale liquidation of call loans
depressed the value of stocks.
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in the call loan market, extensive liquidation
of call loans by trusts threatened the assets of
national banks. Although trusts and national
banks were legally distinct, both intermedi-
aries operating in the call market were eco-
nomically integrated. It was because national
banks and the clearinghouse were aware that
the runs on the trusts could spread to the en-
tire financial system that they acted directly
to stop the runs.
Conclusion
Some important policy lessons emerge
from this case study of the 1907 Panic.
Restriction of the types of investments nation-
al banks could make in 1907 did not reduce
the overall riskiness of the financial system's
assets; rather, the uneven regulation of trusts
and banks concentrated riskier assets in a few
institutions, primarily the trusts. Negative
shocks to trust assets, notably collateralized
loans, raised the specter of their possible in-
solvency. If regulations allowed intermedi-
aries comparable access to all assets and
investment opportunities, the potential for
adequate diversification of portfolios might
reduce the risk that the collapse of one type
of asset would threaten the solvency of an en-
tire class of intermediary.
Nor is it certain that access to the New York
Clearinghouse could have averted insolvency
among thrifts in 1907, given the high concen-
tration of risk in their portfolios. Although the
clearinghouse functioned to some extent as a
central bank, lack of explicit legal authority to
issue clearinghouse loan certificates kept the
clearinghouse from fully exploiting these func-
tions. It did maintain records on the financial
health of participating banks and made this
information available to members. Thus,
when member banks requested aid, the clear-
inghouse had the information necessary to
make a decision quickly. Trusts' limited affilia-
tion with the clearinghouse made information
about distressed trusts harder to obtain and
probably contributed to the destabilizing iso-
lation of the Knickerbocker Trust.
Even with access to a lender of last resort,
under conditions of uneven regulation trust
companies would have had the incentives to
maintain portfolios with profitable but risky
assets. The potential for a financial crisis to
drive a class of intermediaries into insolvency
would remain.
Notes
1Kindleberger refers to "copper speculation" that in-
volved more than just Heinze's corner attempt as a
prime contributor to the panic. Analysis of the copper
market during 1907 is interesting (see the testimony of
Wolfson in U.S. Congress), but the direct links to the
panic are less clear. The connection is left for further re-
search.
2For a discussion of the money supply process in the
National Banking Era, see Goodhart or, for a more con-
cise description, Tallman.
3The aberration of gold flows exacerbated the amount of
gold shipments to the United States when European im-
porters paid for shipments of cotton and cereal from the
United States during the panic.
4There he was recognized as a decisive leader during the
early years of the central bank. His untimely death in
1928, which left the young Federal Reserve System with-
out focused leadership, has been argued by some as
being the reason for the Fed's inept handling of the
bank panics early in the Great Depression (see
Friedman and Schwartz).
5Carosso (1987), citing figures in J.P. Morgan's private
records. A run on Lincoln Trust, a smaller institution,
began with withdrawals exceeding $1 million.
6Sprague (1910, 234). Sprague notes that the six national
banks (National City, National Bank of Commerce, First
National, Chase National, Park National, and Hanover
National) had grown from 30 percent to 60 percent of the
total assets in New York national banks from 1873 to
1907.
7Kindleberger suggests that the trusts were responsible
for excessive credit expansion related to speculative ac-
tivities prior to the Panic of 1907.
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